RNAi Therapeutics A Bright Spot In Dark Biotech Winter

Over the last couple of weeks, we have seen business development activities in the RNAi space that made me realize that the modality has firmly established itself as the third drug development pillar next to antibodies and small molecules.  At the same time, surviving RNAi variations DNA-directed RNAi and microRNAs are catching a bid.

Biogen and Abbvie invest

Most Big Pharma companies have a history of making significant investments in the sector.  The early (2004-2009) significant moves by Roche, Novartis, Takeda, and Merck were not well rewarded.  This was partly because they lacked patience and the willingness to protect early platform development from the incongruent demands from their in-house therapeutic area groups.  Novo Nordisk got the timing right when acquiring Dicerna in late 2021.  Similar to Eli Lilly (through license to Dicerna IP and subsequent in-house work), they are now well placed to capitalize on the promise of RNAi for large cardiovascular and metabolic disease applications.

Amgen and Takeda stand to benefit from two opportunistic deals with Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals for candidates that are now in advanced phase 3 clinical development.  The RNAi agents for alpha1-antitrypsin-related liver disease (Takeda) and Lp(a) (Amgen) for cardiovascular disease will read out as early as next year.  Both companies speak highly of these products.  Amgen in particular highlights the Lp(a) program as its most exciting development candidate in corporate presentations and I expect the company to be back for more RNAi.

Two pharma/big biotech companies that stood out for having watched the developments from the sidelines are Biogen and Abbvie. 

Biogen has gone out of their way and tried it seems every oligonucleotide modality but RNAi.  This includes RNaseH antisense and splice modulation with Ionis and Stoke Therapeutics and microRNAs with Regulus.  It had done so after laughing off RNAi as a scientist’s sandbox idea when presented with it early on by Phil Sharp, scientific co-founder of both Biogen and Alnylam, and thus turned down the opportunity of a life-time to take a major stake in it.  

Instead, a certain former Biogen employee, John Maraganore would go on to build Alnylam into a major biotech player with Alnylam's market cap now exceeding Biogen's.  In a personal anecdote to illustrate the lack of appreciation of RNAi at Biogen at the time (2002), when I did an internship at Biogen and attended a job interview presentation there by a scientist on his RNAi work at Cold Spring Harbor, I was pretty much the only attendee not directly involved in the hiring process.   

It took a leadership generation and a realization that Biogen has become a dinosaur in the drug development industry that it recently finallyinvested $46M in a deal for a CNS target with you would not believe it: City Therapeutics, co-founded by John Maraganore. 

2 weeks before it, Abbvie did a broader collaboration and license option agreement with ADARx for $335M upfront.  Abbvie’s predecessor Abbott had dabbled a little bit in RNAi delivery around the early RNAi bubble, but with no serious intention behind it, really.

MicroRNA dinosaur Regulus taken out by Novartis

As with CRISPR now, the early RNAi bubble phase saw numerous start-ups not only around the core RNAi platforms, but also derivative technologies.  One of them was microRNA therapeutics, a technology targeting or mimicking the endogenous small RNAs of the RNAi apparatus. When the RNAi industry went through the 2010-12 financial bottleneck most of these companies either died or were well on their way. 

Regulus Therapeutics co-founded in 2007 by Alnylam and Ionis around microRNA-targeting oligonucleotides, had the good fortune of having deep-pocketed, influential backers that eventually enabled them to doggedly progress anti-miR17 antisense oligonucleotide farabursen for autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD) to a stage where the FDA aligned with them on a speedy pivotal trial development plan earlier this year.

This triggered a bidding war between Novartis and an undisclosed bidder that on April 30 resulted in a ~10x premium over its 52-week low that will be paid by Novartis, including a $800M upfront and contingent value rights.

 

DNA-directed RNAi Therapeutics create tremendous value for uniQure

In the vibrant field of developing disease-modifying medicines for Huntington’s disease, uniQure stands out with its chance to gain FDA approval in less than a year should 3-year data replicate that seen after 2 years.  This is the big regulatory news of the day for genetically-targeted therapeutic development as uniQure aligned on a path towards accelerated approval, including a comparison with an external natural history cohort.  Turns out, new CBER chief Vinay Prasad is actually human and has compassion for those suffering from severe genetic diseases.

What few people are talking about is that AMT-130 is an RNAi Therapeutic.  It is a DNA-directed RNAi version where the RNAi trigger is expressed from a DNA template following AAV delivery.  The key to uniQure’s success is that delivery is done locally by intracranial access to where the gene suppression is thought to be required (Spronck et al 2021; cool video illustration here).  In the case of Huntington’s disease, it is the striatum; in the case of AMT-260 for mesial temporal lobe epilepsy where uniQure presented intriguing seizure reductions in the past week, the hippocampus. 

By precisely following how the target structure is filled up with the AAV solution, potential toxicities in off-target tissues can be avoided.  Obviously a big advantage at a time when the AAV field is struggling with toxicities due to systemic administration of large vector doses.

What is more, DNA-directed RNAi allows for durable, potentially permanent gene silencing without the need for an exogenous protein.  This comes as genome editing, be it via CRISPR or Sangamo’s zinc fingers, are hammering away at solutions for gene knockdown that require exogenous protein expression.  Sometimes the old ways are more elegant after all.  Being out of fashion has the advantage of allowing you to build value with less friction. uniQure is about to capitalize on that in a big way.

 

Pure-play RNAi stocks budding during biotech winter

All this is happening as RNAi bellwether Alnylam ($40B market cap) is hitting new all-time highs and is about to catch up with and likely overtake Regeneron ($53B market cap) to become the 3^rd most valuable biotech behind Amgen and Vertex Pharmaceuticals.  Besides the ATTR amyloidosis opportunity, this prices in the potential of Alnylam's pipeline to address huge markets such as Alzheimer’s and obesity with well tolerated, infrequently administered RNAi.

Silence Therapeutics has also risen slowly, but surely over 200% in the last 2 months.  As Lp(a) RNAi is increasingly seen as a must-have in the cardiovascular disease space, its phase 3-ready candidate SLN360 alone could be well worth a multiple of its current $275M market cap.  Add to this its 25 year experience as a pure-play RNAi developer and inhibinE for obesity being an easy target with their technology, Silence Therapeutics is ripe for an acquisition.

Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals is also up over 80% in the same period as revenues in the form of ApoCIII knockdown for high triglyceride-related disease and co-commercialization and royalty/milestone revenues come into closer focus.  Amgen would be an obvious candidate to make a play for Arrowhead, also because Arrowhead can now manufacture large amounts of RNAi triggers within the US.

There are a lot of lessons to be learned from the history of RNAi Therapeutics.  One is that financial bottlenecks can richly reward those that persevere, also because it creates scarcity value and reduces competition.  In general, the current biotech winter which forces companies to focus on their most promising and competitive product candidates will translate into greater profitabilities down the line.  In a twist of irony, as the CRISPR field is going through its own bottleneck, CRISPR Therapeutics now spending money on a non-core RNAi asset, thus keeping spend unnecessarily high and losing focus, is not what the doctor would order based on RNAi history. 

I believe that as long as Trump’s trade war does not result on a run on the US dollar pushing interest rates up, anticipation of Fed Chief Powell’s replacement in May 2026 will allow these assets to come to fruition in a much less capital-constrained environment for biotechs.

PTC Therapeutics Full-Length Huntingtin-Targeting Pill Comes Up Short, Setting Stage for Exon 1-targeting ddRNAi by UniQure

Today, PTC Therapeutics reported full results from a 52-week trial with PTC518 for Huntington’s Disease.  The data failed to support an intriguing early data cut last year that prompted Novartis to pay $1B for shared US profits and majority rights outside the US.  Unlike the previous n=32 data hinting at dose-dependent full-length huntingtin lowering (up to -43% in the CSF at the high dose) and corresponding improvements in functional outcome measures, the company had to dig deep to find hints of functional efficacy in today’s n=159 dataset.  In other words, an accelerated approval based on the PIVOT-HD trial is now highly unlikely.  Even huntingtin knockdown came down from -43% reported last year to the -20-25% range in the CSF and was not dose dependent.

That Novartis licensed the PCT molecule was surprising to me in the face of overwhelming evidence that protein derived from exon 1 huntingtin mRNA is the toxic molecule and increases in production as the CAG triplett somatically expands during the disease course (see this blog entry).  To me at least it seems that full-length huntingtin has fairly little to do with contributing to the disease.  Indeed, some had started to worry that targeting (full-length) huntingtin may even be harmful based on striatal atrophy caused by an antisense compound by Roche and Ionis (which I and others think can be attributed to the problematic phosphorothioate backbone chemistry of tominersen).  So at least in that sense, comfort can be taken from the PIVOT-HD results that there was no apparent worsening of disease caused by full-length huntingtin-lowering by the PTC518 splice modulator pill.

I can see that taking a once daily oral pill instead of drilling a hole in your skull may be preferable and an enticing prospect for a Big Pharma, but what good is that when the pill aims at the wrong target and will not work?  Of course, UniQure’s AAV-based DNA-directed RNAi therapy capable of targeting exon 1 mRNA will eventually be challenged and complemented by similar, but less invasive exon 1-targeting oligonucleotides or the nascent class of triplett expansion inhibitors, but a lot has to be said about the virtues of a drug that is not only targeted at the right transcript, but also where the exposure is limited to the main affected structure in the CNS.  

So while I understand that PIVOT-HD will cause some disappointment in the Huntington’s community, the data is making much more sense again from a mechanistic point of view following the confusion caused by the earlier data cut.  This should also give regulators further impetus to fast-track AMT-130 towards accelerated approval based on an upcoming 3-year comparison with propensity-matched natural history data.

Ionis Widens Its Modality Horizons

Over the weekend, blue chip antisense oligonucleotide company Ionis and genome editing competitor Intellia presented data on targeting prekallikrein (PKK) for treating hereditary hemeangioedema (Ionis donidalorsen here, Intellia NTLA-2002 here).

Using CRISPR Cas9 endonucleolytic disruption of the KLKB1 gene coding for PKK following LNP delivery, Intellia came out as the apparent winner in this showdown.  Not only did they demonstrate more pronounced PKK inhibition, but also more consistent elimination of debilitating attacks characteristic of the disease.  Moreover, by exploring less frequent antisense oligonucleotide administrations despite suboptimal low -60% knockdown, Ionis indicates that it is worried about the safety and tolerability profile of donidalorsen. 

Whether reversible approaches like antisense and RNAi or irreversible approaches like CRISPR gene disruption will ultimately prevail in the HAE race remains to be seen and will likely be decided by the safety of suppressing PKK expression over the long-term. If there is an overshoot of CRISPR-mediated gene disruption that would e.g. result in blood clotting abnormalities, even for a subset of patients, the field would be wide open for reversible methods.  

Ionis invests in genome editing

But whether that will be antisense remains to be seen.  Especially for targets in the liver, RNAi currently clearly rules the land for gene knockdown: highly potent, titratable and reversible knockdown with 5 years counting without a notable setback, especially related to off-target toxicity.  By contrast, Ionis is being held back by persistent safety issues as it has been beating a dead horse with its phosphorothioate-based backbone chemistry although it appears to be finally weaning itself off with chemistries such as the Mspa backbone.

So it is probably the hope of leap-frogging the RNAi competition by adopting genome editing as Ionis today announced that it was partnering with CRISPR genome editing company Metagenomi.  The HAE data comparison could not have come at a more opportune time.  

One declared aim of the investment in genome editing is life-cycle management of existing franchises.  In the liver, these franchises (TTR amyloidosis, ApoC3, PCSK9 etc) are currently and in the foreseeable future being dominated by RNAi despite Ionis’ heavy investments, so it clearly makes sense to amortize its investments in disease-specific market research, commercial infrastructure and clinical trial experience to accelerate the success of a more promising approach. 

TTR amyloidosis is a great example where even GalNAc-conjugated follow-on antisense compounds are unlikely to challenge Alnylam’s suite of RNAi triggers.  Also due to this dominance, it makes less sense for Ionis to develop an RNAi competitor drug despite its access and now actual adoption of this modality for targets in the muscle.  But as TTR shows, other genome editing companies are already competing for some of these targets so it won’t be all that simple trying to leap-frog RNAi and Alnylam like that.

 

The rise of the multi-modality oligonucleotide therapeutics companies

After straight-forward antisense for gene knockdown and then splice modulation, with the recent adoption of RNAi and genome editing, Ionis is rapidly expanding its oligonucleotide modality toolbox.

In fact, it is becoming a little bit like smaller competitor Wave Life Sciences which has been practicing all types of antisense (knockdown, splice modulation, more recently RNA editing) and RNAi using a bewildering mix of chemistries.  Not only are they burning through cash as if there was no recession and inflation problem, I never liked that because clinical failure after failure (esp. minute target engagements at best) suggest that the company is stretching itself too thin.

By comparison, Ionis, with $2 billion in cash and a more experienced and bigger operation is a different beast altogether and may be able to pull it off, at least on a technical level.  However, instead of spending $80M in upfront alone on a modality that is somewhat further removed from its traditional chemistries (longer mRNAs, LNP delivery for CRISPR), it could have much more synergistically leveraged its investments in chemistry and delivery by investing that same amount in the ripe-for-the-picking RNA editing.  Accordingly, $80M is more than the market cap of my currently favourite RNA editing investment, ProQR.

I’m sure the opportunity to expand druggable targets and indications by applying existing delivery technologies and chemistry know-how by adopting RNA editing is not lost on RNAi players such as Alnylam and especially Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals.  Arrowhead in particular, having scooped up the RNAi assets of Novartis and Roche for peanuts has demonstrated an ability to recognize and act on similar opportunities.

Arrowhead Acquires 30 Alnylam Exclusive, Priority Target Picks and Plus More from Novartis

Arrowhead Research keeps mopping up the billions of Big Pharma dollars spent on RNAi Therapeutics R&D and IP.  After acquiring the Roche assets for dimes on the dollar in 2011, heralding Arrowhead Research becoming a real biotech company, it is now Novartis’ turn to give their RNAi assets to dedicated RNAi hands.

What Arrowhead bought

For $10M and $25M in cash and stock, respectively (representing a dilution of ~5%), Arrowhead research acquired

1)      new Novartis RNAi trigger chemistry that the company claims to fall outside competing RNAi trigger IP (thus avoiding milstone and royalty obligations);

2)      intriguing new RNAi trigger chemistry that supposedly enhances RISC RNAi effector loading of RNAi triggers in the cytoplasm and which  could enhance the potency and duration of gene silencing; and

3)      the RNAi-related IP rights that Novartis acquired from Alnylam in 2005, most notably the 30 target picks.

Arrowhead in the house

10 years ago, Novartis made headlines by getting access to 30 exclusive target picks under Alnylam RNAi trigger IP.  For the privilege of picking targets not only ahead of Alnylam, but also excluding Alnylam from these targets, Novartis paid $10M in cash and made a $58M equity investment at a 16% premium to the ALNY trading price back then (so say $20M overall), plus the usual biotech milestone (up to $700M) and royalty obligations.

At the time, Alnylam was criticized for selling much of the farm.  This is because 30 target picks might have been too much given the state of RNAi delivery technology at the time.  Archrival Sirna Therapeutics gloated that it would never enter into such broad sweeping deals and consequently started to win business from other Big Pharma names, culminating in the $1B acquisition by Merck in 2006.

Novartis had time until October 2010 to officially nominate its target picks. At the time, SNALP LNP delivery to the liver was the only game in town for clinically relevant RNAi delivery.  Therefore, if Novartis had any brains, it would have spent some of the picks on the juiciest liver targets in addition to their oncology dreams.  

Usually, I don’t give much credit to the critical thinking ability of Big Pharma, but given that a number of Novartis RNAi folks came from Sirna Therapeutics and had worked on liver targets such asHBV early on, it is a good assumption that, yes, a few targets are aimed at the liver.

Note also that Alnylam never entered the HCV drug development race, instead pointing to their unwillingness to compete with its microRNA joint venture Regulus Therapeutics for the target.  I never bought that argument and instead suspected that Novartis was on HCV.

This, of course, adds an interesting facet to the somewhat uneasy relationship between Arrowhead Research and Alnylam and how today's deal impacts Alnylam’s 3 STAr franchises, namely viral hepatitis, cardiometabolic, and orphan diseases.

Value of Novartis RNAi assets in the eye of the beholder

I fully expect the usual suspects to spin today’s news as Arrowhead Research (once again!!) acquiring assets that a Big Pharma had put on hold (in the case of Novartis in early 2014) and nobody else allegedly wanted.  This may be partly true given that Novartis did not appear to be successful at developing strong RNAi delivery technologies.  So the Novartis RNAi assets in isolation may not have been worth that much.

Arrowhead, however, is in a different position given that its DPC delivery technology is being validated in the clinic.  I expect the ARC-AAT results towards the end of the year to remove any doubt about that.  Moreover, Arrowhead is on track to commit its subQ DPC version into clinical development, instantly increasing the value of any cardiometabolic targets that Novartis may have picked.

This illustrates that for Arrowhead Research today was about expanding its RNAi trigger IP leverage in addition to increasing its chances of finding the best possible RNAi trigger against a given target from its broad stable of RNAi trigger structures and chemistries (usiRNAs, Dicer-substrates, canonical), and finally adding a unique RNAi pharmacology trick to its toolbox.  All of this to be married with its DPC delivery technology so that the result would be worth far more than the sum of its parts.

Today, we have only glimpsed part of the strategic and technological importance of the deal. Stay tuned as the movie unfolds.  Kudos to Arrowhead Research for making the bold, but mostly right strategic decisions.

Why Marina Biotech Deserves a Chance

Oligonucleotide Therapeutics is hot.  Outside of immune-oncology which is breaking new ground in cancer, Oligonucleotide Therapeutics is where the real innovation in drug development happens today. In fact, Oligonucleotide Therapeutics already has become the third major drug discovery engine and I posit that at the development stage it has already surpassed monoclonal antibodies.

   

This is also reflected by the valuations of the two best known proponents in the field, Alnylam and ISIS Pharmaceuticals which are both worth around $8 billion, a valuation that given its purchasing power that comes along with it positions them to become major pharmaceutical companies.

It is then long after the behemoths and mid-tier companies like Arrowhead Research and Regulus Therapeutics which struggle for similar recognition with market caps in the 0.5 to 1 billion dollar range, that Marina Biotech comes in with an anemic, fully diluted market cap of ~30M.

Vicious circle

A 300x valuation difference to the leaders will put off most investors from conducting more in-depth research.  Surely, a $30M valuation shows that its technology does not work.

  

This detrimental circular logic extends into business development where Marina Biotech has essentially given away valuable pieces of its technology stable for pennies.  Licenses to CRN technology to Novartis for a mere $1M or UNA technology to Arcturus for a few hundred thousand dollars are sad examples of this.

Of course, at the time the deal were done, Marina Biotech was in dire straits financially and this was exploited in cold blood by its partners.

OK, that’s business, nothing personal, and good on Novartis and Arcturus for their bargains.

Overall, Marina Biotech is probably one of the two most prolific deal makers in the industry along with ISIS Pharmaceuticals, reflecting its broad assets in Oligonucleotide Therapeutics.

UNA-CRN Antisense Oligos, it’s as simple as that

This, however, is also a distraction for management and I am afraid that the CEO, Michael French, keeps looking under the wrong lamp posts for capital.

In his opinion, Marina Biotech should be the one-shot shop for Big Pharma looking for solutions against certain disease targets where the best mechanism of action is not apparent. 

Myotonic dystrophy type I, a muscle wasting disease caused by a toxic nuclear RNA, is probably a good example of this, and this is also Marina’s lead development project if we ignore for a moment its legacy program in familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP) now in phase I clinical development.

I, however, struggle to come up with many more examples of this, and if I were a Big Pharma, I would just evaluate the different strategies in-house and, if necessary, then gain access to that one most promising mechanism of action.

This blogger, on the other hand, believes that the public markets should be Mr French’s audience.  Times have changed and the public markets have become a much more attractive source of capital for supporting platform companies like Marina Biotech. Big Pharma, on the other, likes to talk about innovation, but ends up acquiring only specific development candidates close to the finish line.  And if it engages in innovation, it usually fails as a result of their organizational rigidity and leaders better suited to run fast-food companies than technology companies.

Imagine how the simple message that Marina Biotech has a chemistry strategy that can do what ISIS Pharmaceuticals has achieved would resonate with investors?  

I am referring here to the potential of combining UNA with CRN (similar to 2.5 cET by ISIS Pharm or LNA by Santaris/Roche) chemistry which just as proposed for usiRNAi triggers  could evade some fundamental IP in the field by virtue of UNAs not being your typical modified base, an idea that has gained wide support in RNAi Therapeutics (à Tekmira, Arrowhead Research, Arcturus).

It should also be noted that only Marina Biotech has the ability to combine both UNAs and CRNs. Despite their licenses, neither Arcturus nor Novartis can do that.

What I also like about the UNA-CRN antisense focus is that such a simple molecule is ideal for a small company like Marina Biotech which does not have much research to speak of.  The antisense concept is so simple that even a blogger would be able to translate it into the clinic from the comfort of his home.

Marina Biotech, of course, is no ISIS Pharmaceuticals, and I should state that my ‘never-touch portfolio’ which I established last summer almost exclusively consists of ISIS Pharmaceuticals which, at the time, accounted for more than half of my stock holding.

Marina’s Outlook

Depending on risk tolerance (an investment in Marina Biotech is still a survival play), however, Marina Biotech has its rightful place in the investment space which explains this blog entry in the first place.  If Michael French could only get himself to commit to a simple CRN-UNA ASO strategy and show some data from its Myotonic Dystrophy program, Marina’s severe undervaluation relative to peers would instantly become obvious.

It’s OK, however, to analyze clinical data from its FAP program as long as it does not cannibalize investments in the ASO platform.  It may also be an excuse to enter the GI ASO space which, following a $700M+ license from Nogra Pharma to Celgene, has come into high demand among Big Pharma.  Although I do not think GI-ASO is technically a robust opportunity as the liver and CNS, if Big Pharma likes to part with $$$, why not cater to them?

Following the filing of an S-1 securities registration statement and in light of Marina’s financial position (cash runway until mid-2015), it is obvious that Marina Biotech will raise capital in the near future.  It will be telling on what terms this will be done and who will participate.  While you will read in most biotech investment textbooks not to invest in those times, remember that in 2013 somewhat similar circumstances set up Arrowhead Research for a more than 10x return in less than a year.

Pharmaceutical Mega-Deals Could Delay RNA Therapeutics Partnerships

Pharmaceutical mega-deals are en vogue again.  Though not official, rumor is that Pfizer intends to acquire AstraZeneca for $100B, and deal engine Valeant has gone hostile on Botox maker Allergan with a ~$45B bid.  As if that weren’t enough for what was supposed to be a quiet Easter weekend, double-digit billion figures are being moved across the table in an asset swap between Novartis and GSK.   

The motivations for all these deals are essentially the same: squeezing out short-term profits by slashing R&D.  Valeant is an interesting example as it never pretended to be in the R&D game in the first place.  Instead, it exists on the notion that R&D is inefficient and risky and financial engineering through M&A instead of drug development is the only way to Big Pharma bliss.  Considering its spectacular rise to a ~$50B market cap company and a relentless increase in its share price, it has the goods to show for it. 

Pfizer, on the other hand, like all Big Pharmas likes to tout its R&D prowess webcast after webcast, R&D day after R&D day, but in fact is the worst offender when it comes to squeezing profits from slashing R&D.  In just 5 years following its acquisition of Wyeth, the R&D budget of the combined companies has been cut in half.  AstraZeneca is partly a juicy target because it was forced to be more risk-taking in its R&D as it gained the reputation to be the Big Pharma with the least innovative and effective R&D. 

As a consequence of this, AstraZeneca has become one of the most active Big Pharma in RNA Therapeutics with deals in antisense (ISIS), microRNAs (Regulus), RNA modulation (PTC Therapeutics), and most famously the 2013 $240M upfront mRNA Therapeutics deal with Moderna. 

Unfortunately/fortunately, depending on whether you think Big Pharma involvement in RNA Therapeutics is a good thing or not, the other two deal protagonists from this weekend, Novartis and GSK are also amongst the Big 4 Pharmas in RNA Therapeutics (Sanofi/Genzyme being the 4^th).

In addition to cost savings by cutting R&D outright, RNA Therapeutics deals could also be affected by Big Pharmas becoming pre-occupied with re-organizing.  This is based on experience as the narrative is that when Pfizer acquired Wyeth in 2009, Wyeth had by far the superior RNAi development effort, but that this fell victim to the acquisition.  Similarly, when Roche acquired Genentech the same year, RNAi Therapeutics quickly fell down the priority list.

What deals may be canceled or at least delayed as a result of these developments? 

mRNA delivery is the first one that comes to mind as I believed AstraZeneca to be under pressure to do something in this area after having spent probably $300M on mRNA Therapeutics by now.  

We have already heard about Novartis which had been another top pick for a delivery deal to go with its target picks from Alnylam.

Fortunately, RNA(i) Therapeutics is in a different position from what it was in 2009.  Cashed up and with robust, clinically validated technologies, a number of companies do not depend on dilutive Big Pharma deals any more- at least for now.  Let the deals therefore happen.  They will only accelerate the demise of the old pharmaceutical model to be replaced by innovative biotech companies.  

Dicerna Trying to Succeed Where Novartis Has Admitted Defeat

This week, newly public RNAi Therapeutics company Dicerna initiated its first phase I study of a Dicer-substrate-based RNAi Therapeutic.  DCR-MYC targets the well-known Myc oncogene utilizing a liposomal delivery formulation (EnCore) for targeting a variety of cancers, solid and hematological (à Myc and lymphoma) malignancies alike, but with a planned focus on primary liver cancer in future studies.

The cancer trial start coincides with Novartis’ bitter, brake-slamming exit from internal RNAi Therapeutics development, largely blaming lack of suitable delivery technologies.  In particular, in classic Big Pharma style, Novartis seems to have selected its 31 RNAi trigger picks under the 2005 Alnylam license not based on where delivery is most advanced, but based on where it wished to strengthen its disease franchises.  It is this putting the cart-in-front-the-horse attitude that is at the root of Big Pharma’s miserable failure with an emerging platform technology that has its own mind of where it wants to go first.

According to commentary by Alnylam, cancer appears to have been a focus of Novartis’ target selection.  With regard to delivery to cancers, I would agree with Novartis to the extent that it is not as far developed as for example for the liver.  A problem with it is the inter- and intra-cancer heterogeneity of the EPR effect that most current cancer delivery approaches rely on.  You therefore have to be quite careful as to which cancers you select.  The same heterogeneity applies to target receptor expression (e.g. LDL-receptor, folate receptor) and Tekmira will have its good, not necessarily publicized reasons for why it chose neuroendocrine (NET) and adrenocortical carcinoma (ACC) for its ongoing phase II trial with TKM-PLK1, preliminary results from which are expected this year.

I’ve had the pleasure of attending the European Symposium of Controlled Drug Delivery in the Netherlands this week and presentation after presentation showed that for most liposomal formulations, tumor penetration is a major issue.  The good news is that EPR is very real, but the field has come to a point where it needs to establish the rules for which cancers are amenable and which strategies (size, lipophilicity) can be employed to aid in tumor penetration.

Imaging studies presented at the conference and the recent (conditional) European marketing approval of the companion-diagnostic/folate receptor-targeted cancer drug pair by Endocyte (Vintafolide) strongly suggest that patients should be pre-selected based on whether they have cancers amenable to EPR.  For example, pre-treatment with a small dose of the drug co-formulated with a diagnostic contrast reagent would both visualize amenable tumors as well as have the side benefit of de-sensitizing the patient to hypersensitivity reactions that are typically observed for infused drugs during the first administration.

So while I remain uncertain about the specific prospects of DCR-MYC partly due to concerns around the target and partly due to the relative inexperience of Dicerna in liposomal delivery, RNAi Therapeutics will become a reality in the treatment of cancers.  Just don’t expect clumsy Big Pharma R&D to rise to the challenge.

Arrowhead Research Patent Application Shows Ample Experience with Triantennary GalNAc-siRNAs

[Warning: this blog entry is not about to discuss a very recent development, but rather is intended to compare the liver gene knockdown technologies by Arrowhead Research and Alnylam based on a review of the patent literature; for the non-technical folks, a mention of Novartis towards the end might be of interest]. 

It has become clear that the DPC technology by Arrowhead Research, especially their 2-molecule-version used in ARC520 for chronic HepB, and Alnylam’s GalNAc-siRNAs share a number of features.  Based on patent application by Arrowhead Research that published last summer, there is evidence that the company has ample first-hand experience with the platform used by Alnylam.  Importantly, the data show that the addition of an endosomal release agent greatly increases the potency of GalNAc-siRNAs.

Large increase in potency with endosomal release polymers

Previously, I had speculated that simple GalNAc-siRNA conjugates as advertised by Alnylam have insufficient potency.  Accordingly, patent application US2012/0136042A1 by Alnylam showed that whereas simple GalNAc-siRNA conjugates had no or very little knockdown activity, the addition of a lipidic pharmacokinetic modulator with some endosomal release activity such as cholesterol allowed for more robust activity (see first image below).

Demonstrating the superiority of DPC delivery technology for gene knockdown in the liver, at least in terms of potency, the patent application by Arrowhead Research shows that even so, the activity of a GalNac-lipid-siRNA pales in comparison to its use along an endosomal release polymer: no knockdown with GalNAc-palmitoyl-siRNA alone, but an 80% knockdown when given together with the polymer (see table).

Note that a range of lipids, including cholesterol were evaluated in that patent application.  Also note that the preferred GalNAc-conjugation was the same triantennary GalNAc structure as used in Alnylam’s programs.  

Intellectual property consideration

While the Alnylam patent application claims priority to sometime in 2007, the Arrowhead patent application claims priority to sometime in 2010.  Given that the data suggest that Arrowhead should have chosen the triantennary GalNAc-cholesterol-siRNA backbone for ARC520 for maximum potency with the 2-molecule DPC approach, instead of the cholesterol-siRNA that they eventually chose, it is possible that IP concerns played a role in that decision. 

Another, non-exclusive explanation might have been manufacturing cost concerns which should favor simple cholesterol conjugates over triantennary GalNAcs.  This would also be justified in that it is the toxicity from the endosomal release peptide and not the RNAi trigger that is expected to be rate-limiting in terms of toxicity.  In other words, to compensate for the inferior potency of cholesterol-siRNA along the release polymer, you just give more of it.

In any case, given the overlapping research activities of the two companies as evidenced by the patent applications, possibly partly the result of the former Alnylam-Roche partnership, it will be interesting to follow the patent prosecutions to find out to which extent the patents by Arrowhead Research could impair the freedom-to-operate and novelty of Alnylam’s platform, both with regard to GalNAc3-siRNAs and GalNAc3-lipid-siRNAs.

An interesting player in this convoluted situation is Novartis.  Assuming Novartis has access to GalNAc-siRNAs from Alnylam, they might be able to combine them with the endosomal release polymers from Arrowhead Research for optimal DPC2.0 knockdown activity (of course, that assumes they take some sort of license from Arrowhead Research).  It’s time for Novartis to show their RNAi delivery hand anyway lest they suffer the same fate as their peers' with their RNAi investments losing all of their value.

Single-molecule subQ DPC

The potentially convoluted IP situation is another, albeit secondary reason, why I greatly look forward forward to Arrowhead Research adopting for their upcoming development candidates the new old single-molecule DPC technology for which they had shown very impressive non-human primate data at last year’s OTS meeting. 

Because the GalNAc residues in the single-molecule DPCs are distributed along the peptide, there is no need for a triantennary GalNAc cluster for similar hepatocyte targeting potency.  Moreover, PK modulation can be achieved by modifying the polymer without the need for direct modification of the RNAi trigger.

And with regard to ARC520- don’t get me wrong. The intravenously administered ARC520 is still an exciting candidate with good activity, it’s just not as potent as it could have been.  I therefore look forward to seeing a second-generation candidate enter clinical development once clinical proof-of-concept for the immune reactivation hypothesis has been formally obtained.  Such a candidate would have much increased potency (at least 10x) and could be administered subcutaneously.  A high-quality problem to have.

A Sign That Big Pharma Could Recognize the Low-Hanging RNAi Therapeutics Fruits

It was with much amusement and head-shaking disbelief that I read the Li et al. paper oncancer RNAi Therapeutics  development from Abbott.   The amusement stemmed from the fact that in the paper, the authors had come to the obvious conclusion: current technologies should allow you to develop real-world therapeutics based on the RNAi platform if only you judiciously combine the delivery platform with the right target and indication.  Duh…

As such, Abbott is representative of the various Big Pharma companies that guttered in-house RNAi Therapeutics development as they chose to only see the challenges instead of realizing the obvious opportunities.  Even those still in the game like Merck have long liked to go around and teach everyone how super-diligent, but super-slow their RNAi Therapeutics game strategy was. 

As RNAi Therapeutics have created market values at lightning speed (Alnylam now at a market cap of $3.5 billion), not based on just hype, but based on paths well-trodden by orphan drug companies, I expect more and more Big Pharmas to re-think their strategies.  Maybe even listen to this blogger who has always advocated a pipeline strategy that is based on where your delivery technologies can go to, instead of the traditional cart-before-the-ox-I-want-the-next-blockbuster-pill wishful thinking by people who may have risen to the corporate tops in companies like Coca Cola.
  

C’mon scientists from Merck, Novartis, and Takeda.  Inside yourself is an innovator that finally wants to see how your technology performs in humans.  Instead of just focusing on what could go wrong, don’t you also have an obligation to address diseases of high unmet medical need? And if not you, then who is going to transform your organization into a dynamic science-driven one that you can identify with as a scientist?  On a more practical level, I cannot see how many of you will be with your present employer in 2-3 years if you don’t have the goods to show.  Look at what happened to your peers from AstraZeneca whose last job it was to look for partnership in the more innovative pure-play RNA Therapeutics space before they were given the boot. 

The Time for the U(nusual)siRNA Strategy Has Come

As Tekmira and Arrowhead Research will unveil their next RNAi Therapeutics development candidates later this year, an interesting question will be whether these will involve one of their RNAi trigger options that some consider to be unencumbered by fundamental IP related to traditional designs (esp. the Baulcombe and Tuschl II IP).  These decisions could have important strategic consequences for the competitive landscape, from targets and indications to Big Pharma involvement.   

Support for freedom-to-operate claim

One of these designs is the usiRNA from Marina Biotech.  These comprise at least one ‘unlocked’ nucleic acid monomer (UNA) in the double-stranded RNA molecule.  While I have reservations about the scientifically tenuous claim (see here why) that UNAs are not to be grouped with most of the other nucleotide modifications for RNAi use because they lack an intact ribose group, usiRNAs were held to be sufficiently non-obvious and of specific utility that the USPTO issued fairly broad claims in 2012.  Moreover, Marina Biotech once commissioned an external IP lawfirm perform a freedom-to-operate analysis on usiRNA, and (surprise, surprise) came to the conclusion that, indeed, usiRNAs have FTO.

Overcoming target picking limitations

This view seems to be shared also by others in the industry. Notably, Roche RNAi (now part of Arrowhead Research) in 2009 gained access to Marina’s usiRNAs, meroduplex siRNAs, and Dicer-substrate RNAi triggers.  This came as a surprise given that Roche had spent over $300M just two years earlier to gain access to RNAi trigger IP held by Alnylam.  Given that none of the three licensed RNAi trigger forms and related IP poses any FTO threat to traditional Baulcombe-Tuschl designs, the most likely explanation for the move is that it was about allowing the company to escape the target picking limitations under the license from Alnylam.  This included the 31 targets exclusively held by Novartis, some Tekmira exclusive target picks, and some targets pursued by Alnylam that Alnylam exempted from competition.  Whether the last of Alnylam’s Big Pharma licensees, Takeda, might pursue a similar strategy is an interesting question.

Facilitating platform partnerships

When Alnylam and ISIS sued Tekmira for infringing on their RNAi trigger IP by collaborating with Bristol-Myers Squibbs on RNAi delivery, it became a priority for them to have access to or control over non-Alnylam RNAi triggers.  As a consequence, they obtained an exclusive license to Halo-Bio’s multivalent RNAi triggers (more than two strands).  Subsequently, they gained access to Marina’s usiRNAs, including the ability to sublicense.   This now puts them in the position to engage in platform partnerships with Big Pharma companies that do not have access to Alnylam IP.

The same strategy would likely also apply to Arrowhead Research with its various RNAi trigger options that it inherited from Roche, especially if Alnylam provided Roche with only product-specific sublicensing rights, if at all.  As RNAi Therapeutics enjoys a return of pharmaceutical interest, this one-stop-shop option by the two leading delivery companies could be critical to bringing new companies into the space.

And for Alnylam, these developments would not only diminish the royalty it might earn from licensing its IP, they could undermine their own product candidates, including ALN-PCSK9 (hypercholesterolemia) and ALN-AT3 (hemophilia).  Accordingly, the preclinical data strongy suggest that subcutaneous DPCs can do everything that Alnylam’s GalNAcs can do, only much more potently and with less frequent dosing. 


 

What to Expect from RNAi Therapeutics in 2013

2012 was the most exciting year in the ~12-year history of RNAi Therapeutics- both from a scientific and financial perspective.  Left for dead by most, unambiguous gene knockdown results in Man have allowed the technology to regain much-needed respectability.  With the start of 2013, the industry is looking to build on these successes with additional clinical trial results, interesting new therapeutic candidates and product-specific and platform-related deals, particularly in the area of delivery.  With appetite for innovation increasing in a low interest rate economy and with the orphan drug tsunami, 2013 could be a quite rewarding year for the discerning investor.

Clinical results to look out for

Clinical results in 2013 that will continue to shape perceptions of the technology include phase II study results for ALN-TTR02 in TTR-FAP by Alnylam, phase I results from its GalNAc conjugate version ALN-TTRsc, and phase I results from a number of other programs, foremost from oncology drug candidate TKM-PLK1 by Tekmira, ALN-AT3 for hemophilia by Alnylam, and finally RXI-109 for dermal scarring by RXi Pharmaceuticals.  

For ALN-TTR02, it will be important to confirm the impressive knockdown results from the phase I study, but over longer periods of time and with still acceptable safety.  ALN-TTRsc will be an important proof-of-concept for the subcutaneous delivery of RNAi Therapeutics and should provide a good idea of what to expect for ALN-AT3 which is based on the same GalNAc siRNA conjugate technology.  The success or lack thereof of Alnylam’s GalNAc technology will also affect the perception of Arrowhead’s DPC technology as either a competing or necessary subQ alternative to GalNAcs.

Tekmira’s TKM-PLK1 has not gotten much credit so far.  This, however, could change with the presentation of the full phase I results, possibly at this year’s ASCO.  I consider PLK1 as the single most attractive target for cancer RNAi and I am bullish that the molecular analyses will show molecular, if not clinical efficacy at this early stage.  And while TKM-PLK1 could overcome the safety-efficacy hurdle for some indications, the importance of PLK1 as a target demands that Tekmira will continuously work on improved follow-on versions.

Finally, RXi’s second phase into RNAi for skin applications.  I also consider dermal scarring as an interesting differentiated, because cosmeceutical RNAi product opportunity.  

Cool pipeline additions

As detailed in my last blog entry, there are two exciting infectious disease drug candidates for which clinical development will ramp up in 2013: Arrowhead’s ARC520 aiming to achieve for HBV what has recently been achieved in HCV (dramatically increased cure rates and less suffering from the side effects of interferons), and Calimmune’s ddRNAi-based HIV drug candidate aiming to keep the virus out of immune cells.

It looks like we will have to wait for clinical efficacy results from these programs for a while (2014-2015), either due to the nature of the cell competition approach involved in the HIV program or because of the use of healthy volunteers.  I believe the latter is what Arrowhead has guided for ARC520, but from an investor perspective this would be highly unforunate as this would delay the demonstration of gene knockdown with the DPC platform.  And from a medical perspective, I am struggling to see what the value or necessity of a volunteer trial would be.  

Deals and Big Pharma

In addition to clinical trial results, RNAi Therapeutics investors will be getting up each morning to check the internet for whether a deal has been announced.  Alnylam’s ALN-PCSK9 is the most imminent partnering candidate and will be an indicator of the mere differentiation value of RNAi Therapeutics.  While clinically more advanced monoclonal antibody-based programs for the industry’s most desired target, PCSK9, exist, should monoclonal antibody stumble as a class, RNAi Therapeutics and ALN-PCS could suddenly have the market for itself.  Considering the multi-billion $$$ potential of PCSK9, a gamble worth taking for a Big Pharma in my opinion.

Similarly to ALN-PCS in the hypercholesterolemia market, the size and complexity of the clinical program that would be required to turn ARC520 into a major HBV drug well exceeds Arrowhead capacities, and this could mean that we will see an early licensing deal around that asset, too.  While proof-of-concept clinical knockdown data would greatly increase the partnering value of ARC520, from a financial perspective (--> di-lu-tion!) early partnering may be prudent if no alternative non-dilutive capital alternative presented itself.

As delivery is gating for all of the above RNAi Therapeutics product opportunities, delivery naturally should be the subject of a few more platform-type relationships.  Tekmira’s SNALP technology for addressing diseases of the liver, lung, and cancer tops the list for a meaningful partnership (>$10M upfront), and also Arrowhead’s DPCs for liver-targeted gene knockdown ought to see some interest.  

Delivery-related deals should also reveal which Big Pharma company is still committed to the RNAi Therapeutics platform.  For the efforts at Takeda, Merck, and Novartis (the three most significant ones in terms of investment to-date), it could be a make-or-break year.  I cannot imagine that these groups are allowed to exist in their current forms for much longer before they get anything into the clinic.  For this, they probably need to swallow their own pride and accept that expert outside help is necessary for their delivery needs (rather than attempting home-brew versions).  Given the recent clinical and late preclinical results for SNALPs and DPCs, chances that they will finally do something have certainly increased.

A Happy New Year everybody.

Tekmira Regains Control over Leading Delivery Technology

When Tekmira filed its lawsuit against Alnylam in March 2011, it found itself in an impossible position: Alnylam’s apparent mis-use of SNALP-related trade secrets not only diminished their strategic value to Tekmira, including depriving it of potential pharmaceutical partnerships, Tekmira may even not have been able to use the technology it invented.  As a result, it might have been left to die in a little cage with ‘1^st generation’ technology as its technology was making rapid progress.    

Cash and Control

Based on the disclosed terms of last night’s settlement with Alnylam (Tekmira's version here, Alnylam's version here), Tekmira got essentially all that it needed: control over its leading systemic RNAi Therapeutics delivery technology, including the contested MC3 lipids of which the IP was assigned to Tekmira, and a $65-75M payment (~$16-18M of which will go to pay outstanding legal fees).  The payment, of course, will finally allow the otherwise financially conservative company to push forward their development pipeline with interesting therapeutic candidates such as TKM-PLK1.  Notably, as part of the settlement, Tekmira obtained full ownership over this candidate which I believe addresses one of the most exciting RNAi targets in oncology. According to the Q3 financial results, also released today, TKM-PLK1 has been making good progress, including showing signs of drug activity and will advance into phase II studies next year.

Beyond the cash, the new IP licensing arrangement between the companies is at least as valuable.  Importantly, Tekmira has regained exclusive sub-licensing rights to ‘LNP intellectual property’, an incredibly important part of the settlement as before that Alnylam enjoyed such control, mainly via its rights to the Semple-Wheeler IP covering important aspects of ionizable SNALP technology.  This should open the door for Tekmira to enter into the long-expected pharmaceutical partnerships. Novartis and Takeda are here the most obvious near-term candidates for platform-type relationships.

Assuming that the new relationship is not restricted to RNAi Therapeutics, an added bonus is that the settlement could similarly pave the way for relationships in the microRNA Therapeutics space, particularly for the delivery of microRNA mimics.  Only recently, privately-held Mirna Therapeutics made headlines by raising $34.5M to fund the development of a microRNA mimic into the clinic, indicating the significant interest in this area of drug development.

Value of the Trade Secrets

Less clear is the damage to the trade secrets that were at the center of the dispute and on which much of Tekmira’s strategic advantage rested.  Numerous groups and companies have attempted home-brew liposomal RNAi trigger delivery, but only Tekmira’s technology has made it into the clinic.  Especially the ability to formulate and manufacture the particles is what set Tekmira apart from the competition.  In their press release, however, Alnylam stated their intention to use its own LNP manufacturing capabilities.  Apparently, it has already established such GMP manufacturing capability over the last year (in a separate building apparently for added suspense).  Assuming that Tekmira did not assist them in establishing such manufacturing, this indicates that the number of people with critical knowledge to the trade secrets has grown.  This can be particularly a problem in the wake of lay-offs in a place like biotech world capital Cambridge, Mass. 

Still, I assume there to be significant hurdles for other companies to replicate Tekmira’s processes, and with its liposomal experts, Tekmira should continue to lead in advancing SNALP delivery, making it the liposomal delivery partner of choice.

With cash of around $50M (excluding the $10M which are contingent on likely 2013 development milestones for ALN-VSP02 and ALN-TTR02), partnerships likely to come in due to the clarified IP situation, the $141M DoD Ebola biodefense contract (a new more potent and safer formulation will be used) and the income stream from Talon Therapeutics, Tekmira has thus emerged as the vibrant RNAi Therapeutics company it should have become 3 years ago.  Nevertheless, today's terms underline the value of Tekmira and RNAi delivery in general.  Exciting times ahead.

Novartis Sells $30M Worth of Alnylam Stock

Last time I’ve checked, Novartis was not desperate for cash.  The cash-flow of Big Pharma is still one of the most impressive features of their businesses, maybe more so than their innovative juices. 

It therefore strikes me as very odd that Alnylam has just provided notice that Novartis last week sold approximately $30M worth of their stock, and has a remaining holding of $80M.  If Novartis wanted to get out of Alnylam, and worse still, RNAi Therapeutics altogether, why not sell the entire stake at once and get it over with?

For Novartis, Delivery is Now or Never

Novartis has RNAi trigger IP rights from Alnylam for 31 targets.  However, the IP, especially the Tuschl II 3’ overhang one which I consider the most valuable, albeit not gate-keeping part of that decimated estate, is ageing rapidly.  Novartis therefore needs access to some clinically viable delivery fast.  Tekmira’s systemic SNALP delivery, of course, is currently industry-leading and, also considering the IP clock (~2020-2021), is an obvious technology for Novartis to utilize.   

Indeed, Tekmira’s Complaint against Alnylam includes a charge that Alnylam allegedly manufactured SNALP LNPs for Novartis, despite the Tekmira/Protiva-Alnylam Agreement that clearly state that Tekmira is the exclusive liposome manufacturer until late-stage clinical development commences.  This would seem an easy charge to verify (note: this is a Count that is independent from the MC3 story). If so, Alnylam’s very survival would also depend on the silence of Novartis (and its other current and former Big Pharma partners).  It is also known that the Head of RNAi Therapeutics at Novartis, David Morrissey, is intimately familiar with Tekmira’s technology from a hepatitis-related collaboration when still at Sirna Therapeutics (~2004-5).

Since neither Alnylam nor Tekmira have a clinically-focused hepatitis program, I suspect that at least HepC has been picked by Novartis exclusively; HepB may be co-exclusive with Arrowhead/Mirus..hence 31 and not 30 targets.

All this leads me to the following speculation (and I emphasize that this is just my speculation, nothing more): Novartis is shifting their RNAi Therapeutics budget to invest $30M or more in delivery technology.  If that involved Tekmira's technology it could also be part of an effort to resolve the hard-fought litigation.  

Novartis’ delivery strategy is one of the industry’s best-kept secrets, but with the August 2012 Marina Biotech oligonucleotide modification deal and an estimated 60-100 employees working on RNAi Therapeutics at that company and having played the game relatively smartly compared to its Big Pharma peers Merck and Roche, which leads me to believe they are not getting out of RNAi Therapeutics (also in light of the recent clinical results), some of that secret may soon be lifted.  

Shoppers- Attention Please! Marina Bio High-Affinity Nucleotides On Sale

Why pay tens of millions to ISIS Pharmaceuticals or Santaris for modified nucleic acid chemistry when you can get the same, if not better from Marina Bio for just a million?

This is the question that Novartis probably was answering when they non-exclusively licensed CRN technology (for single and double-strand oligo Rx) from Marina Bio for just $1 million in upfront considerations.  CRN stands for conformationally restricted nucleotides, similar in shape and thermodynamic behavior to Santaris’ LNA technology, a technology that is also being researched by ISIS Pharmaceuticals.

To me, CRN has been the best bet for Marina Bio's corporate survival.  The reason is that selling a nucleotide modification, especially for antisense therapeutics should be fairly straight-forward: there is no formulation involved requiring support by a functioning laboratory, just include it in standard phosphorothioate oligos like everybody else.  This comes in handy when you have become a largely virtual, IP-based biotech company like $3M market cap Marina Bio.   

I had wondered whether the reason why Marina Bio had not been able to capitalize on this opportunity so far was either due to IP uncertainties or manufacturing issues with this novel nucleotide.  The latter issue seemed to have been resolved when Marina in May of this year struck a cGMPsupply agreement with Girindus. The IP issue I have to admit I have not researched in too much detail, but suffice it to say that my understanding of Santaris’ and ISIS’ CRN patents is that they are quite structure-specific which would move the IP issue more to questions surrounding their use in general (e.g. in gapmers and the like).  

Today’s announcement also confirms that Novartis is still in the game of oligonucleotide therapeutics after picking their 30+ targets from Alnylam and a product-specific deal on an RNAi Therapeutics from Quark.  Although $1M is not much to a Big Pharma, nobody wants to part just like that with a million, even if it means being able to rescue old friend Michael French (now for the second time after the 2009 mdRNA cash crunch, Marina Bio’s predecessor).

Today’s deal further fuels the rekindled fire of commercial small RNAs:

1)      impressive clinical results by Alnylam facilitated by Tekmira’s technology;

2)      penny stock investors multiplying their money following the Medicare coverage announcement for Rosetta Genomics' Cancer of Unknown Primary miRNA diagnostics;

3)      Rosetta Genomics gearing up for the commercialization of the test in what is a whopping $>25M offering for the company;

4)      new investors in Silence Therapeutics doubling and tripling their money overnight in a new share offering;

5)      and the Tekmira-Alnylam trade secret theft show-down coming to a widely followed climax.

Big investors may be jeering at such nanocap biotech companies, but it is a fact of life that most small silencing RNA companies have become pennystocks, which also means that their resuscitation could make for some nice investment returns.

Alnylam Shocks with a further 33% Reduction of Its Workforce

When I saw the announcement a few minutes ago, I had to gasp for air: A little more than a year after laying off 25-30% of its workforce after Novartis failed to exercise the $100M IP option, Alnylam announced this evening that it will further reduce its workforce by another 33%. Even the PR person seemed shocked, as the same PR went out twice.

Following recent guidance that the company would only advance two clinical candidates for orphan diseases, ALN-TTR and ALN-APC, on its own dime and was planning to give everything else away in their pipeline at what could likely be at firesale prices, it already looked like something was deeply wrong. Today’s news and Alnylam’s lawsuit this week against Tekmira in an apparent desperate attempt to make anything stick against that company, only add to that suspicion. After all, Alnylam still enjoys a fairly lavish cash balance of $260M, and its share price, especially in light of the very positive clinical results recently, would put it again into a position to raise a bit of capital on the public markets.

The cost-saving measures and the new mantra of having transformed from a platform into a product-focused company is also at odds with the notion that Alnylam wants to remain at the forefront of RNAi Therapeutics innovation.

Moreover, when the Novartis lay-offs were announced, it was naturally felt that it would be a good thing to make one deep cut and be done with it instead of depressing employee moral by a series of gradual workforce reductions. I’m therefore convinced that today’s news had not been anticipated back then.

So what’s wrong?

The only reasonable explanation that I can come up with is that they are putting contingency plans into place for a potentially hefty settlement with Tekmira. A capital raise may be difficult to do if they had good reasons to expect that the Tekmira litigation could end up being costly, in which case they would probably have to disclose that in a prospectus.

I know- these are a lot of speculations, and definitely don’t buy Tekmira shares based on those. I invite you though to share your suspicions of what’s going on inside (survey on top right hand corner): a) the company has lost all belief that the science will mature in time; b) they expect the Tekmira litigation to end up being very costly and are starting to save up for it (settlement or buy-out); or c) none of the above.

My eyes are now peeled on that financial guidance in February, and I'm truly sorry for all those that now see their lives turned upside down after having pursued the dream of turning RNAi Therapeutics into a reality.

Mr. Anonymous Thwarted in Zamore US Patent Re-exam

Silence Therapeutics reported that a number of valuable RNAi trigger patents related to the Zamore Design Rules that were issued last year in the US were upheld following a re-examination request by an anonymous 3^rd party. Even stronger claims related to the same Zamore patent series have been issued in Europe, and unsurprisingly Alnylam, but also Novartis and Alcon are opposing them with the outcome to be decided (EP 1633890 B1). However, given the importance of both the US and Europe in the commercialization of innovative drugs, having a patent position in one jurisdiction alone can be considered a valuable strategic asset already.

The Zamore Design Rule patents are owned by the University of Massachusetts and exclusively licensed to Silence Therapeutics for medical uses. As described in more detail in other blog entries before (here and here), they cover methods of promoting the incorporation of the desired guide strand into the RISC gene silencing complex as well as of enhancing RISC turnover resulting in more effective and selective RNAi knockdown.

Especially the patent covering guide strand selectivity methods (‘thermodynamic end-stability rule’; US 7,750,144) is widely recognized in the art for greatly increasing the likelihood of finding efficacious RNAi triggers and is incorporated in essentially all bioinformatic sequence pre-selection algorithms. It has to be said though that the claims do not cover the entire spectrum of approaches of achieving differential end-stability. They do, however, cover chemical and structural approaches that have been reported by a few companies such as Marina Biotech and Sirna/Merck before. Moreover, because the coverage involves modified nucleotides, there will be the concern that even if such modifications were applied for other purposes (e.g. stability or immune abrogation), they may fall under the patents. Consequently, a company with a promising late-stage candidate may want to take a license instead of taking a chance in an infringement lawsuit.

This makes it the second time within a week (see PKN3 opposition by Alnylam) that important patents by Silence Therapeutics were upheld essentially unchanged following challenges. Alnylam’s management once laughed off the value of the Zamore patents in a conference call following their issuance last year. They obviously considered them serious enough to oppose them in Europe and Alnylam is certainly the most likely identity behind Mr. Anonymous (have your say by participating in the survey on the right). Less likely, but not entirely out of the question would be a Big Pharma company like Novartis which is considering taking a license to the Zamore patents, but first wanted to kick the tires before it did so (patents that have been unsuccessfully challenged are considered stronger).

With all these patent successes, and at least one more likely to come, Silence Therapeutics need to monetize their assets in the form of non-dilutive funding.

Hemophilia Gene Therapy Success Bodes well for ddRNAi Therapeutics

Following years of public scorn and derision, including by Alnylam which in 2006 waved off ddRNAi Therapeutics and gene therapy as ‘dangerous’, gene therapy is back with a vengeance. This week, a consortium of researchers reported in the New England Journal of Medicine that an self-complementary AAV8-delivered Factor IX transgene was able to significantly correct hemophilia B in a small clinical trial.

4 out of the 6 patients treated were able to largely discontinue the standard frequent (often 2-3 times a week) and expensive use of prophylactic recombinant FactorIX protein therapy which accounts for estimated healthcare costs north of $20M a lifetime. This means that even in the limited duration of the trial (6-16 months of follow-up), the low cost of the gene therapy ($30k cost of goods for a treatment that is expected to last many years if not a lifetime) meant that this therapy is already saving money (and improving quality of life). If the results can be confirmed in a larger trial and the side-effects, including transient liver enzyme elevations can be controlled with similar efficiency as in this small one, approval may not be that far away.

The hemophilia results also bode well for ddRNAi Therapeutics. First of all, the study has validated the safety and efficacy of delivering the highly promising AAV vector family by peripheral vein infusion to the liver. This represents progress over a previous hemophilia gene therapy study which employed considerably more invasive direct hepatic infusion. In particular, it is likely that, should the ddRNAi collaboration by Tacere/Pfizer for HepC continue, it would involve not only the same vector family (AAV) and target organ (liver), but also the same serotype (AAV8) and self-complementary genome strategy as employed in this hemophilia trial.