I have been following
ISIS Pharmaceuticals for a dozen years now and have heard Stan Crook, its CEO,
promise his shareholders in as many years that profitability was just around the
corner. Over the last 4 years, he’s also
been promising that KYNAMRO will be highly profitable, and indeed just at the R&D day yesterday, he said that KYNAMRO would make ISIS profitable or at least will
be profitable for ISIS under the Genzyme agreement.
The reality
has been that none of that has materialized and sales of KYNAMRO, which
essentially is a placebo with serious safety issues, must be so enormous that
ISIS has not had to break out its sales one year following its launch (my sense
is that it’s been growing exponentially from 1 patient to 2, 4, and now
perhaps 8 subjects with familial hypercholesterolemia).
In fact, his
delusion (he would probably call it his optimism) was on full display at the
2012 OTS meeting when he gave a keynote speech during which he celebrated
himself for the first approval of a systemically administered oligonucleotide
(KYNAMRO) which he said ‘had no side effects’.
And, of
course, the other perennial Stan classic: ‘partnership
interest has never been greater’ -rain or shine.
People older and wiser than me will probably have the same
story to tell, but going back not one, but close to 3 dozen years. So the Street has stopped listening…
Why it’s different now
Today, however, I will make the case that the situation has
changed and that ISIS Pharmaceuticals is set to become a major, major
pharmaceutical company within a decade. Think $100B market cap and more. In 20 years, it could be bigger than Apple is
today with the only dilution being excessive stock option gifts to Stan and his
management team.
The perfect storm is the result of improvements in 5
critical areas: platform technology, pipeline, target space, commercial and IP strategy.
1. Platform Technology
Phosphorothioate antisense oligonucleotides (ASOs) rely on saturating
target- and non-target tissues with large amounts of potentially
immunostimulatory sticky chemistry to achieve activity. For KYNAMRO, the toxic tipping point was reached
at 200mg per week with hardly any gene knockdown activity (first reported to be
40% and then seemingly coming down to 20% as drug development progressed).
For other candidates using the same 2nd
generation gapmer chemistry, the doses used in clinical development are not that different, but with improved 60-80% potency at 200mg, and much more robust knockdowns at 300mg and 400mg. The safety profile also seems to have improved-
although here I really want to first look at the briefing documents at the end of the
development cycle based on the KYNAMRO history.
So at minimum, you have significantly improved potency with
equivalent safety which would push open the technology to a number of
additional applications beyond the extremely severe and rare populations such as those with homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia.
The potency improvements can be ascribed to just having the
technology and capital to screen many more oligonucleotides for drug
activity. On the safety side, there may
have been improvements by better understanding which sequences to avoid to
minimize immune reactions.
Behind 2
nd gen chemistry, I’ve been quite
impressed by the GalNAc-conjugation data revealed at
AsiaTIDES which showed
~10x improvements in activity, and a re-direction of oligonucleotides from the
kidney to the liver, both with major implications for the safety of
phosphorothioate chemistry (see also supporting data by Regulus Therapeutics with its anti-miR122 candidate). If now most
of the oligonucleotides are in the target cell, many of the extracellular
safety issues with the sticky chemistry will disappear.
And it does not have to stop here. Since at least for RNaseH-mediated gene
knockdown and the regulation of nuclear RNA, nuclear localization is required
for ASO activity, how about attaching a little postcode to the ASO to get the
oligonucleotide into the nucleus? ASO is
wasting a lot of its potential in the cytoplasm since most oligonucleotides, at
least in non-cycling cells, remain in the cytoplasm.
In combination with higher-affinity chemistry, ligand-targeting
and nuclear localization could make oral delivery a stroll in the park.
2.
Pipeline
Until early 2013, the claim by ISIS of having more than 2
dozen drugs in the pipeline was meaningless.
Most of these candidates were either commercially dead (KYNAMRO, Alicoforsen, Vitravene), had ceased active
clinical development, belonged to other companies (!), or were in phase I.
Today, this picture has changed dramatically. Two major studies in the diabetes
(
ISIS-GCGRx) and blood clotting fields (
ISIS-FXIRx) have read out positively over
the last week. If the safety of these candidates is half as good as claimed in
the press releases, they have be major blockbusters. As the phase III planning is ramping up for
these candidates, ISIS-SMNRx for spinal muscular atrophy and ISIS-ApoCIIIRx are
promising compounds with significant commercial opportunities that will soon be
in phase III.
Behind the growing late-stage pipeline, there is a whole
bunch of earlier-stage candidates addressing exciting targets from the
common (e.g. Apo little a) to the rare/severe disease spectrum (e.g. Huntington’s, myotonic
dystrophy type I). This pipeline is
starting to look stronger and more diverse than any in the industry (hence the
above projection of ISIS becoming a, if not the major pharmaceutical company).
3.
Commercial strategy
The most advanced candidate of commercial potential in the
ISIS pipeline is ISIS-TTRRx for the treatment of TTR amyloidosis. Leaving aside the inferior potency compared
to Alnylam’s RNAi competition, this candidate with ~70% knockdown of the toxic,
disease-causing gene in its own right has solid therapeutic prospects. However, the financial windfall as that from
the next most advanced candidate, ISIS-SMNRx, will fall to a pharmaceutical
partner.
You only need to consider the relative market capitalizations
of ISIS ($3B) and TTR competitor Alnylam ($4.5B) when you understand that in
order to become a major pharmaceutical company, you need to retain significant
commercialization rights for commercially attractive drugs and not cap your
upside in phase I or even at the preclinical stage as happened with SMNRx and
TTRRx.
This picture, however, is changing, and with ISIS-ApoCIII, ISIS-GCGRx,
and ISIS-FXIRx, the company now has exciting 3 phase III-ready candidates which
it still owns 100%.
4.
Expanding target space
In addition to improvements in gene knockdown, ISIS
Pharmaceuticals is also firing on all cylinders as it comes to exploiting
additional mechanisms and targets that only antisense oligonucleotides can
address such as modulating splicing in a sequence-specific manner (àe.g. ISIS-SMNRx) or
reducing toxic RNAs (à
type I myotonic dystrophy). So in
addition to applying ASOs to the 75% of the undruggable protein-coding genome,
ISIS can take advantage of the exploding insights into the involvement of RNAs
in disease and exploit modulating RNA processing to a therapeutic end.
In sum, ISIS Pharmaceuticals has the largest druggable
target space at its disposal in the industry.
When you are the only game in town, often addressing the root cause of a
disease, there is not much to convince regulators and payors to approve and pay
for your drug.
5.
IP ever-greened
When you have invented a method to invent, you can make life (freedom-to-operate) difficult for your competition. But
beyond asserting questionable claims against the competition, the fact that
ISIS is continually improving on their technology and is filing for new patents
can have profound impacts on their partnering and commercial strategy.
This is because one concern with the broad partnerships that
ISIS has entered with the likes of BiogenIdec, GSK, and AstraZeneca is that
they are giving away too many attractive targets. Although this is pure speculation at this
point, it would be interesting to think that these licenses have not given the
partners perpetual rights to the targets involved and that at some point, for
example once ISIS has developed oral versions for these targets, ISIS could
compete with these older drugs and retain full commercial value.
In general, the IP ever-greening strategy means that even if
the target space stayed the same, ISIS could continue to draw value from it and overtake the Big Pharma that have been feeding it.