Once
considered a new star on the biotech firmament, the most prominent microRNA Therapeutics
company is going from bad to worse fast.
Last week, Regulus Therapeutics announced that both of its clinical programs in Alport’s Syndrome and autosomal dominant
polycystic kidney disease (AKPKD) had been voluntarily halted for financial and
preclinical reasons. Instead, the company will now try to renegotiate the
Alport deal with Sanofi and use its remaining resources to focus on a preclinical
program for HBV.
Management
not in control
The program
pauses follow a string of other setbacks over the last 3 or so years. Most
prominently, it discontinued a highly promising candidate for the treatment of
HCV due to safety questions and having been a few years too late to a highly
competitive game. A slow early advancement of
that miR-122 program was partly to blame for this.
After that,
it has been one delay after another for various programs. Partner AstraZeneca e.g. returned a liver-targeted
metabolic program and the Alport's program has been hit by multiple delays and trial
reconfigurations.
If this was not sufficient proof that managing a biotech company has been well above the
paygrades of the multiple executive teams that have come and gone over the years,
running out of cash in this genetically-focused biotech bull environment is simply
unacceptable. Even if microRNAs may have
lost its early luster as targets for particularly complex diseases, I had
thought that having exclusive access to the huge IP portfolios of parent
companies Ionis and Alnylam for microRNA Therapeutics purposes would provide a
powerful backstop when it came to accessing fresh capital.
With a
market cap of less than $40M and last week’s ‘we’ve-run-out-of-cash news’ I was obviously wrong…
Chasing a 'safe' target
Since microRNAs
which typically have a range of biologically meaningful targets are thus
promising for treating particularly diseases of complex causes and manifestations, I would have
thought that with the genetics gold-rush that we are now witnessing in
neurology, not least because of antisense drug SPINRAZA, there would be much
interest in Regulus Therapeutics there.
I
understand that HBV is becoming a hot area again, with the skyrocketing valuations of
Arrowhead, Dicerna, and Arbutus suggesting that high rates of functional cures
are just around the corner. Going after HBV with a microRNA, however, would seem like a surprising choice though given that in terms of direct
antiviral activity, a microRNA approach should pale in comparison to the RNAi competition. You would therefore think that Regulus is
considering a immune reactivation-related microRNA target for HBV, but it is
not clear to me which model they would be basing this on.
Hey, management, at least show us some data to hang our hats on when you sell a preclinical concept as your future.
Or does choosing HBV betray that they have lost all confidence in their ability to deal with the biological complexity of microRNAs, instead seeking safety in just measuring simple viral knockdowns?
After the
quasi-demise of microRNA diagnostics leader Rosetta Genomics, there is now the real prospect that the therapeutics counterpart will equally go belly-up
soon. In order to avoid that, Regulus
needs new, confident management first and foremost as the main task now is to
make the case for microRNAs as therapeutic targets. Where are all the boastful biotech executives when you need them?
2 comments:
Many reasons for RGLS failure:
Poorly structured deals with GSK, Sanofi, and AZ (Let us count the ways...).
Poorly managed HCV program – many missteps along the way,
including a lost year as the program was “shelved” for a
year in 2011 by NG.
Alienation of parent companies Ionis and Alnylam. Multiple
eras of scientific leadership (CSO NG and Chief R&D Officer TW)
adopted a “we are from big pharma and know better” attitude,
and openly rejected advice from Ionis and Alnylam leadership.
At one point (still?), SC at Ionis refused to accept calls from
RGLS leadership.
Alienation of internal scientific talent. Both NG and TW wanted
"yes" people.
Failure to capitalize on oligo “druggable” space (liver, kidney,
CNS, ocular)
TW halting work on CNS and ocular space upon his arrival because
“it was a waste of time” (i.e. it wasn't his idea), then later
changing his tune after seeing success of SPINRAZA. Reactionary
vs. Visionary.
Throughout history of company, failure to invest in robust internal
target ID/target validation activities. Made the company completely
reliant on outside world (academia) for finding new targets.
Misguided foray into oncology chasing unvalidated targets.
Mismanagement of RG-012 biopsy and HERA studies by TW; ego got in
the way of speedy execution.
As for path forward, there is zero incentive for Sanofi to re-negotiate
terms of Alport deal. Sanofi owns target and has right of first refusal
for RG-012.
It was always understood that the ADPKD would require a partner to run
POC trials. Failure to find such partner speaks to inability of current
leadership to execute.
Just happened to read this article again. Four years later and they still have a market cap of $40M, but at least they managed to raise some funding recently and cash is at about $65M. They hope that the new version of the ADPKD RGLS8429 is a cleaner version. Should start P1 SAD in June of 2022. And, they are looking at a reverse split (again) of at least 1 for 10 to fix the listing problem.
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